The Secularization of Christianity Part VI - Signs and the Supernatural

As I pick up with the discussion from Mascall's book, the focus of the chapter at hand takes another turn as it begins to discuss the importance of religious symbolism and how it relates to the overall topic.  The classic definition of a symbol is that it is something that points to something else beyond itself, and we see symbolism everyday.  As a part of our faith pilgrimage, symbolism also plays a huge role as well, and often a natural symbol points to a supernatural reality, such as the Eucharist for one example.  Those who attempt to secularize Christianity often also tend to radically reinterpret symbolism to strip it of its supernatural dimension, as for the secularist the supernatural is irrational and therefore irrelevant.  This is what Mascall is addressing in this section of the chapter.

To preface the discussion, Mascall points to a book by Dr. Peter Munz (1921-2006) entitled Problems of Religious Knowledge, a book Munz authored in the year 1959.  To give a little background on who Peter Munz was, he was a historian who was native to Italy but immigrated to New Zealand in 1939, and then earned his Ph.D. at Cambridge in 1948.  He taught history at the Victoria University of Wellington up until the late 1980's, and he is noted for some rather odd views on some things.  He created some controversy in 2004 when he proposed that incestual sex between two consenting adults was perfectly acceptable, and that laws should be changed to reflect that acceptance.  His views on this so shocked the New Zealand lawmakers that they closed discussion on it (Patrick Goodenough, "'Legalize Incest' Suggestion Shocks Lawmakers," published May 21, 2004 at https://web.archive.org/web/20041013155609/http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCulture.asp?Page=/Culture/archive/200405/CUL20040521a.html - Accessed 2/28/2018).  Although Munz's controversial remarks about incest were almost 40 years after Mascall's book was published, it illustrates the type of mindset that secularization represents - in this regard, Munz is no different than controversial moral philosopher Dr. Peter Singer (also Australian) who advocated for infanticide and incest, bestiality, and other taboo practices as well.   It is of interest though that Munz, a historian, is pontificating on religious symbolism - I mean, the man is not a theologian, nor is he even a philosopher, yet he feels the need to "wax theological."  Secularization, however, is like that - it tends to make outrageous statements in areas where it has no jurisdiction, and Munz is definitely faithful to that tendency.  So, what exactly did Munz say to merit a discussion of him in Mascall's text?  Let's get to that next.

In the book Problems of Religious Knowledge, Munz proposes that any "religious picture" is not scientific, and is merely emotional symbolism which has a therapeutic effect on its proponents.  To Munz, the symbol depicts nothing supernatural, but rather simply means a feeling-state.  Therefore, to him, its function is not to give knowledge of supernatural realities (which he, as a good secularist, sees as irrational anyway - yet, oddly, incestuous sex is "rational" to this man - odd!) but is merely a therapeutic device to bring about tranquility to its proponents.  It immediately takes on a humanistic dimension then in that it points to anagogy not being abuot the existence of God, but rather the "blessedness" of man.  Therefore, to put it simply, Munz sees religion (and particularly religious symbolism) as a sort of false hope that brings comfort to those who believe in it - it is both patronizing and condescending at the same time.  Mascall though challenges Munz's position with a question on page 21 - does Dr. Munz give an adequate account of the nature of theological discourse?  Mascall correctly concludes that he doesn't even come close.  Munz, in his account, robs the symbol of epistomological function, and essentially Munz robs the religious symbol of its didactic task by reducing it to a merely therapeutic coping mechanism.  This therefore would diminish theology, as for Munz and others like him it reduces theology to a discussion of symbols rather than about God (whom Munz probably denies anyway, as he is more than likely atheistic).  It is an important reason why a historian needs to stick to history, his own discipline, rather than trying to be an "expert" in theology and other disciplines.  The weakness of academic elites however (also shared by many politicians and celebrities) is that they feel their own position endows some sort of non-existent authority on everything to them, but in reality it does not.  At times, it just makes them look like the fools they are.  And, glaring inconsistencies later reveal themselves too - in Munz's case, the denial of God logically opens up the door to the acceptance of consensual incestuous relationships, because with God out of the way and religion reduced to feel-good symbolism, there is no moral law to take seriously so everything is open-season.  All I can say is that earlier people such as Marsilus of Padua, William of Ockham, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Rene Descartes, in their separation of faith from reason, and their secularization of Scripture and religion (making it subject to arbitrary "experts" for interpretation rather than accepting the authority of the Church, whom Christ endowed with that responsibility) led the way for secularization, and secularization in turn led to a decay of values, norms, and boundaries that radically redefined certain behaviors.  As Mascall notes also with the writers he referenced (Robinson, Bultmann, Tillich, Munz, etc.), they all use different methods to convey the same message - the abolition or diminishing of the supernatural element which has characterized Christianity throughout the ages.  He then notes how this diminishing of the supernatural has led to secularization.

Beginning on page 22, Mascall notes that the elimination of the supernatural from Christianity is reliant upon three main types of argument, either separately or in combination with each other.  These include the following:

1.  The Philosophical Type - is based upon existentialism or linguistic empiricism (goes back to philosophers such as Kant, Heidegger, and Nietzsche).

2.  The argument that the discoveries of science have disproved the existence of any supernatural realities or at any rate the possibility of any intervention by them in the natural world.   This argument has its basis in similar lines of thought advanced by Descartes and Spinoza, among others, and also is a basis for the ideas of rationalism and nominalism, where faith is divorced from reason and the latter takes precedence over the former.

3.  The third is a religious/secular argument which proceeds from New Testament study and alleges that the supernatural element in the Gospels can be proved to have no historical foundation but is due to mythopoetic activity of the primitive Church - this is the position Munz takes.

On page 23, Mascall begins to devote the discussion to the contrast between unchanging revealed truth (datum) of the Christian Gospel versus the essentially relativistic, incomplete, and changing intellectual frameworks, conceptual systems, and verbal formulas in which it finds expression throughout the history of the Church.  He then states two extreme positions that he will soundly reject later on, and those are as follows:

1.  The first sees some particular verbal formula or body of verbal formulas as expressing the Gospel exhaustively, as reflected in Protestant Fundamentalism.

2.  The second, on page 24, is the assumption that divine truth is so completely indifferent to the empirical events of the Church's history that its formulation in one particular context is altogether independent of its formulation in any other, thus making it of interest only to historians.

The problem with the first, as Mascall notes on page 23, is that it is assumed that these formulae are exhaustive and precise statements of dogmatic truth, applicable to all times and places.   It is here that I must differ somewhat with Mascall.  The Catholic Church has always held that the teaching office of the Church, the Magisterium, is indeed unchanging and that certain truths are inalterable and do apply to all ages and generations.  I really don't think Mascall overall would dispute that, but his wording in this paragraph of the text is somewhat incomplete and weak in that it presupposes to the less-informed reader that any formulae is debatable and can be "tweeked" at whim to conform with contemporary culture.  The Church has the Magisterium in place to prevent that from happening.  That being said, on the other hand, there are some less-dogmatic praxis areas that can be altered and made relevent to the contemporary age, but there is a fine line there as well - what is acceptable, in other words, may not always be right, and the assumption that goodness and rightness are the same is the flaw of the proportionalist mindset - it is based on the intent/notion argument, and that in itself is flawed in that it denies universals much in the same way as the nominalism of Marsilus of Padua did. Therefore, Mascall's differing with this position is in need of some clarification.

The second is a bit more in line with my own thought.  What Mascall notes about this on page 24 is that divine direction plays no part in the scheme of those who hold this position, and therefore it was merely random chance that the 1st-century Roman Empire and its intellectual climate fostered the growth and development of the Christian Church.  This means then for those holding this view that the Gospel is to be accomodated to the thought-forms and verbal conventions of the local and contemporary environment, as it was supposedly for the Romans of the first century.  The logic behind this is understandable, but also weak, as Mascall points out.  On some minor issues, the transmission of the faith can be appropriated in a local context, but again care should be exercised in doing so.  For instance, a major Catholic theologian of the twentieth century, Dom Bede Griffiths, practically turned himself into a Christian yogi in India and in many aspects became more Hindu than Christian in his theology and practices - that made him suspect in regard to historic Church teaching.  Also, the embrace of many liberal mainline Protestants in the US and Europe of such things as "same-sex marriage" and transgender identity is a mistake in this regard as well, and as these behaviors are contrary to the overall message of the Gospel and the historical position of the Church, they cannot be appropriated.  Therefore, Mascall is correct in refuting such notions, and this leads to the next part of the discussion.

Mascall notes, continuing on page 24, that although much is diametrically opposed in the two positions, they also have some things in common.  To begin, for the Christian theologian, the relevance of systematic and sympathetic study of Christian thought (conformity and contextualization within a given environment) doesn't exist.  The Gospel and the Christian message is in a lot of ways countercultural - in its liberating message of Christ's redemption, it calls for sacrifice and a giving up of those things which hinder the walk of faith, and the concupiscence of human nature ensures that the cultural context is littered with such distractions.  This makes the Church, as Mascall notes on page 25, necessarily a nuisance and irrelevance to the surrounding culture as a historic entity in time and space.  If I may diverge slightly from Mascall's text, the fact of the matter is that the Gospel transcends time, and it instead speaks to the heart of the human condition, which struggles with the same temptations and concupiscent nature in the 21st century that it did in the 1st - as much as some things change, many stay the same.  Human nature has fundamentally not changed either - although clothed somewhat differently, the same temptations and sins mankind has been plagued with throughout the ages are still evident in society today, and therefore the core of the Kerygma is unchanging as well as it still addresses those fundamental issues.   As Mascall notes at the bottom of page 25, both positions have their positives, and to an extent they are both true, but they don't practically work in their purest forms.  As he then notes on page 26, there are exaggerations of the truth in both extremes, but the problem lies not in the fact that they possess said truth, but rather the fact that both positions tend to over-simplify that truth to such a degree that it ignores the complexities of the truths themselves.   If I were to appropriate the aspects of these positions that are true, then here is what I would propose.

In the first, the fact that certain formulae, doctrines, and other traditions of the Church are immutable is the truth that is to be retained.  Also, the universality of the Gospel itself transcends time, and thus has a relevance for humanity in all historic eras of existence.   At the same time though, praxis to a degree can be contextualized - for instance, adopting technology and even on occasion picking out a valid expression of truth in teaching from something like SpongeBob Squarepants is not really a problem, and also expressing incommunicable truth in communicable contemporary expression (provided said truth is not misrepresented or compromised) is completely acceptable as well.  But, again, discernment must be exercised as well, and that is where the source of much debate on those issues arises.  An example is "worship music" in certain churches.  While a certain amount of contemporary instrumentation and fresh hymnody is to be expected, that implementation must be tempered by a fidelity to continuity of the Tradition of the Church, and that is why for instance an acoustic guitar in a Catholic Mass can work, but not a loud rock band.  The form of expression, as Mascall concludes this section of the chapter, is important, and often even classic translations from centuries previous may be imperfect although the truth they communicate is perfect.  When talking of a transcendant God, as Mascall notes on page 27, it is impossible to fully describe who He truly is in finite human terms, as that always falls short.  The symbolism of language, then, reveals a deeper mystery of faith that maybe uttered words cannot express, and that I can appreciate.  It is one reason why the gift of tongues is also integral to the life of the Church too, within proper context of course.  He uses the example of calling God "Father" - while appropriate in human terms, it also is an inadequate means of expressing the fullness of reality of who and what God is and what He intends for us, but in the context it is appropriate in that it does impart a sense of divine paternity and makes it somewhat relatable in human terms.  And, it also, although falling short of fulness, does express a proper reverence and understanding of God Himself to us.  Again though, a supernatural God can never be fully grasped in natural terms, but it doesn't make Him any less a reality. 

In conclusion, language too becomes a symbol, as it points to a greater mystery and reality beyond itself in such a way that although it doesn't express the full picture, it does have a pedagogical role in leading us to the mystery, which is often understood more in unspoken language than in written or spoken expression.  Symbol thus becomes a powerful and important aspect of the faith, and unlike the secularist who dismisses symbol as merely a coping response for a "deluded" believer in something greater than themselves, the symbol is a powerful expression of faith that serves to remind us of eternal truth.  If we divorce that dimension from faith, then the message faith conveys begins to crumble.  And, at that point we'll pick up the discussion next time.